The Sudanese Trojan horse

The National Islamic Front that is led by Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, not to mention its former member and current Sudanese First Vice President Ali Osman Taha, as well as former General and current Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, betrayed democracy in Sudan and seized power via a cunning and duplicitous military coup. This is something that is well-known and well-documented, acknowledged even by National Islamic Front elements and members of the Sudanese “salvation” government. So why are we now hearing talk about something that is well known and which happened more than 22 years ago, during which time Sudan has witnessed what it has witnessed with regards to misfortune and crises? The reasons for this is talk, or let us say rumors and speculation, which have preoccupied the Sudanese people over the past day regarding a coup d’état plot to change the situation in the country by overthrowing the current regime, or putting an end to the “salvation” [government], as some people are framing the matter. This is after the Sudanese regime, represented by the head of the security service, accused the Popular Congress Party [PCP] that is led by al-Turabi of planning to overthrow the government, based upon documents that it claims to have seized in the possession of one of al-Turabi’s closest aides, Ibrahim al-Senoussi. These documents, according to the head of the Sudanese security service, reveal that the PCP views coup d’état as being one of the options to topple the regime; with another option being popular uprising. However according to this story, the government has not interrupted an active plot but rather uncovered documentation that refers to coup d’état as being one of the available options, indeed this is something that al-Turabi has previously spoken publicly about, and he has even repeated such talk in public forums and press interviews, however this did not move from talk into action. It was conceivable for this accusation to be viewed in the context of a “verbal duel” between al-Turabi and his students who reached power via a real coup in 1989. Perhaps this is what head of the National Umma Party and former Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi was making reference to in the speech that he issued last Friday; however there was [also] a misunderstanding in the media’s reporting of his words. Al-Mahdi had indicated that “we received news that one of the [political] parties [of Sudan] wants to carry out a coup d’état.” There was not the least amount of doubt in his speech that he was talking about al-Turabi’s party. Following this, he went on to question the accusation against the PCP, describing this as being false, “not because we know the intentions of this party, but it is false because this is an incapable party, a party that cannot do anything, each time crying wolf.” The talk [in Sudan] therefore revolves around the recent accusation that were made by the regime that the PCP was plotting to carry out a coup, the same accusations that al-Mahdi described as false, from the viewpoint that in the past al-Turabi has issued many threats of coup and uprising without anything materializing. We must here recall that al-Turabi has been arrested around six times since the division occurred between himself and his students, who he claims turned against him around 11 years ago. Every time he is arrested, al-Turabi and his party are accused of plotting to carry out a coup or conspiring against national security or cooperating with the Darfur-based [rebel] Justice and Equality Movement [JEM] or being involved in subversive operations and plots. However each time al-Turabi is freed from detention without being brought to trial, only for this series of events to be repeated once more. The misunderstanding that has raised this controversy is due to previous statements made by al-Mahdi, during which he claimed that elements of the PCP had invited him to cooperate with them to carry out a coup to overthrow the “salvation” government; an invitation that he says he refused. This misunderstanding brought more attention to the accusation, particularly after al-Turabi launched his fiercest attack on al-Mahdi to date, calling him a liar and casting doubt on his testimony to the government. Al-Turabi then went even further, describing the government’s claims as being lies and claiming that the documents that the Sudanese security services had seized were nothing more than internal notes about a discussion which had taken place within the PCP regarding Sudan’s future prospects, which included [discussions of] the possibility of a coup or popular revolution taking place. As for the option options [included in this documents], this was the regime resorting to the bluff of reconciliation, or an internal coup being carried out. The regime resorting to the reconciliation bluff is something that is being carried out today and can be seen in the recent call for a so-called broad-based government, which would see other parties joining the current government, however this government has failed to convince the Sudanese people that this will result in a change in its orientation, or that it is prepared to relinquish its grip on genuine power. In any case, the regime has resorted to such methods for years in order to divide the ranks of the opposition and give the impression that it is moving towards more openness after years of oppression and tyranny. As for the scenario of an internal coup taking place, al-Turabi knows his students and their capabilities well, particularly as he masterminded and implemented a coup against democracy with them. The Sudanese National Islamic Front’s ability to deceive and betray has been clear for all to see since the “salvation” coup and the manner that it orchestrated all the subtle details of this [coup], which is something that is known by many people today, indeed there is not enough space to mention all these details here. However it will be sufficient for me to indicate one detail which has become well known today, namely the National Islamic Front resorting to disguise and camouflage to seize power. This saw members of the National Islamic Front placing its leaders in detention with other politicians detained in the early hours of the coup, in order to protect itself it the coup failed, and ensure that it could return to the political arena with the deceived political parties as if nothing happened. Therefore, Ali Osman Taha remained outside of prison monitoring the details of the coup and the transfer of power, whilst al-Turabi and other members of the National Islamic Front were detained along with other [Sudanese] political leaders. This was not just to disguise their involvement with the coup, but also to spy on the other detainees and uncover any attempts or plans to regain power and prevent this. The question that must be asked here is: if the National Islamic Front has shown that it is this cunning and duplicitous, whilst during the “salvation” government era it demonstrated that it is prepared to do anything to cling to power, is it out of the question that it will utilize this cunning and duplicity to spread the talk of division within its ranks and between its leaders in order to sneak a Trojan Horse into the ranks of the opposition, particularly as this would allow it to spread rumors of coup whenever it likes and take the pulse of the opposition, and prevent their action if necessary? That is the question.