The Russians are coming to Saudi Arabia

Last week I attended a closed seminar organized by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in the US capital. It mainly focused the crises in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. The looming nuclear deal between Washington and Tehran dominated the discussion, since it represents an important political turning point. Some of the attendees asked about reactions towards this deal and its potential consequences, whether on the political or military fronts. Others anticipated that the deal will provoke several countries in the region, encouraging them to work on their own nuclear programs, with the aim being to “obtain what Iran got in its nuclear deal” with Western powers.

This explains the great interest in Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman’s visit to Russia last week. It is now clear that Saudi Arabia has decided to join the nuclear club, by signing a deal to build 16 nuclear reactors, at the same time giving Russia the biggest role in operating and overseeing those reactors. This does not necessarily mean that the Kingdom’s focus is on armament; at the same time, it is a clear sign that Riyadh has decided to enter the nuclear scene. Last month, the Saudi education minister signed off scholarships for 1,000 students to study energy technologies, including nuclear energy.

In my opinion, the most important feature of the Deputy Crown Prince’s visit was that it was not customary; it took place at a time when the United States and its European allies have decided to economically boycott Russia, sanctioning Moscow over events in Ukraine. This time, the Saudi government took an unusual step and decided to do the opposite: rekindle its relations with Moscow, grow business ties, and sign agreements and deals in vital fields such as gas and nuclear and military technologies. This is one of the rare times that Riyadh has taken an opposing line to Washington. But the reason is clear: the Saudis who supported the Western position to boycott Iran for 20 years have discovered that Washington betrayed them when it decided to collaborate with Tehran, without coming to an understanding with its partners who had joined the initial boycott.

Of course, we shouldn’t read into any new developments outside political frameworks, because I can hardly imagine that Saudi Arabia has decided to turn against its alliances—but it probably wants to get out of the narrow US corner and expand its options.

Russia has always been an important country. It has recently decided to become a more active key player in the region, at a time when the current US administration has chosen to significantly shrink its engagement, and adopt policies at odds with those of the Gulf states. The US supported Baghdad despite its sectarian policies, and left the Assad regime in Syria to commit the greatest tragedy in the history of the region: 250,000 deaths and the displacement of 10 million people. It seems that the negativity generated by Washington’s side, and the dangerous outcomes resulting from its policies, have made the Saudis think about expanding their choices and political investments across both East and West.

Although Saudi Arabia reinstated its relationship with Moscow nearly 14 years ago, it has remained limited. No important promises of cooperation had been implemented so far: Saudi Arabia did not buy Scud missiles as agreed, and Russia did not get anything out of the gas deals. However, today it appears that the Moscow–Riyadh road has become more active. Russia’s ambassador to Riyadh, Oleg Ozerov, has said that Russia has been granted an area of land to build the new headquarters of its embassy in Riyadh’s Diplomatic Quarter. In Moscow, President Vladimir Putin reiterated his call to Saudi Arabia’s King Salman Bin Abdulaziz to visit Russia. President Putin has also received an invitation to visit Riyadh.

Saudi Arabia wants Russia, which is a key player in Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon, to be on its side. Russia plays an important role in the military balance with Iran, a task that will need intensive and constant efforts.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily represent or reflect the editorial policy of Arab Today.